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Abstract 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are unlikely to be met by 2015, 
even if huge increases in development assistance materialize. The MDGs are a set of 
quantitative, time-bound targets for indicators such as poverty, education and 
mortality in developing countries adopted unanimously by the UN in 2000. However, 
the rates of progress required by many of the goals are at the edges of or beyond 
historical precedent. At the same time, there appear to be limits to the degree to 
which aid can contribute to development outcomes.  Estimates of the ‘cost’ of 
reaching the MDGs are nevertheless frequently misinterpreted to mean that a certain 
quantity of aid—such as the oft-cited $50 billion—could cause the Goals to be met. 
Despite many benefits of the MDGs, there has been little discussion so far of 
potential costs of the specific form taken by these goals, especially the creation of 
unreasonable expectations about what is achievable in a short time frame and about 
the role of aid in the development process. Many countries making extraordinarily 
rapid progress on MDG indicators, due in large part to aid, will nonetheless not reach 
the MDGs. Unrealistic targets thus may turn successes into perceptions of failure, 
serving to undermine future constituencies for aid (in donors) and reform (in 
recipients). This would be unfortunate given the vital role of aid and reform in the 
development process and the need for long-term, sustained aid commitments. 
Though goal-setting can be useful, these particular goals might be better viewed not 
as practical targets but instead as valuable reminders of the stark contrast between 
the world we have and the world we want, and as a call to redouble our search for 
interventions to close the gap more rapidly.   The Trouble with the MDGs: 
Confronting Expectations of Aid and Development Success 
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2 “The Millennium Development Goals are not just wishful thinking. They are certainly ambitious, but they 
are also technically feasible.” 
  —Kofi Annan, Nov 6, 2003. 
 
“There is a real danger that the MDGs will be remembered as false and empty promises.”  
—Action Aid, 2002 
 
 
In September 2000 at the United Nations, 147 presidents, prime ministers, and 
monarchs—the largest-ever gathering of heads of state—unanimously adopted the 
Millennium Declaration, committing themselves to a series of international development 
objectives to be reached by 2015.
1  Known since 2001 as the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), these eight goals (with eighteen targets and 48 specific indicators) are 
widely cited as the primary yardstick against which advances in international 
development efforts are to be judged.
2  The official MDG website says that the goals 
“have been commonly accepted as a framework for measuring development progress.”
3
 
After the MDGs were established, calculating what kinds of resources and actions would 
be necessary to reach them became a priority. There are now several “costing” studies, 
estimating how much money would be required to reach the goals. In addition to other 
conditions, such as higher economic growth and the improved economic policies, these 
studies have concluded that something in the range of $40-70 billion in extra resources 
each year will be necessary. Fifty billion dollars is the most commonly cited figure for 
new annual aid requirements.  
 
Nearly four years after setting the MDGs, it appears that the global goal of halving 
poverty may soon be reached because of rapid progress by the two population giants of 
India and China.
4  However, it appears almost certain that the majority of developing countries will not meet the country level poverty targets set by the Millennium 
Declaration, nor many of the other goals. And some whole regions, especially sub-
Saharan Africa, will miss them by a wide margin. Of the 47 African countries, 42 are 
considered “off track” for at least half of the targets and 12 are “off track” for all targets. 
Meeting the goals for the majority of country indicators would require more than 
doubling the rate of progress (Carceles et al. 2001).  Bruns et al. (2003) estimate that 86 
out of 155 countries are at risk of not achieving the goal of universal primary education. 
Twenty-seven of these countries are not even expected to break the 50% completion 
threshold by 2015. These forecasts exclude the 16 developing countries with no data—all 
of which are likely to have extremely low indicators. The UNDP (2003) estimates that, 
on current rates of progress, sub-Saharan Africa would not meet the hunger, primary 
education and child mortality targets for at least another century. 
 
This apparently bleak state of affairs is already leading to complaints that the rich 
countries are not living up to their end of the MDG bargain.
6  The eighth goal commits 
rich countries to a global partnership for development, wherein they promise to allow 
greater trade access, reduce debts, and increase aid. Although there has been substantial 
progress in debt reduction, rich country trade policies have not significantly changed to 
be more favorable to developing countries, notably on agricultural market reform. 
Furthermore, the estimated levels of mobilized resources required have not been 
forthcoming from donors. Total official development assistance (ODA) from the main 
international donors
7 was $53 billion in 1999 and this figure rose to just $57 billion in 
2002, far from the doubling of aid called for by a range of costing studies. If many of the 
2 MDG targets are formally missed in 2015, will we be able to point to the failure of 
donors to provide resources as the main culprit?   
 
This paper briefly summarizes the conclusions of some of the better-known MDG costing 
studies. It also reports on the caveats that most such studies include. The paper goes on to 
evaluate the importance of those caveats, starting with the poverty goal and moving on to 
discuss some of the most prominent quality of life indicators, including achieving 
universal primary education (goal two), eliminating gender disparities (goal three), 
reducing child mortality (goal four), and improving maternal health (goal five). As a 
result of a review of some of the historical evidence regarding progress in the indicators 
underlying the MDGs, the paper concludes with three arguments: Many of the goals are 
simply unrealistic for many countries; costing studies are frequently misinterpreted and 
have contributed to an excessive focus on donor resources; and there is a real risk that the 
MDGs—as currently conceived and promoted—could turn development successes into 
failures. 
 
We begin by surveying the clearest example of how the MDGs have been interpreted: the 
studies estimating their ‘cost’. These studies are frequently taken to imply that a 
sufficiently large amount of aid would be sufficient to cause a rapid acceleration in 
historical performance. In the sections thereafter we argue that the historical record and 
numerous studies on the relationship between inputs and outcomes present a serious 
challenge to that interpretation. 
 
3 How the MDGs have been interpreted 
The MDGs began as a review of development policy by the OECD’s DAC in the mid 
1990s. They first appeared in print in 1996 as recommendations in the OECD’s booklet 
Shaping the 21
st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation. These ideas 
evolved over the subsequent years into a set of “international development goals” by 
2000.
8  On September 08, 2000 all 189 UN Member States approved the UN Millennium 
Declaration, which committed them to meeting the MDGs by 2015 (see Appendix Table 
A-1 for a list of the goals and targets).  
 
From the beginning, the MDGs were linked to the need for greater donor financing.
9  The 
OECD states bluntly, “Development costs money…. the high-income countries need to 
supply more aid.”
10   The UN’s Monterrey Consensus proclaimed that “a substantial 
increase in ODA and other resources will be required if developing countries are to 
achieve the internationally agreed development goals” (UN 2002).  
 
The first answer to the question ‘how much?’ was a study led by former Mexican 
President Ernesto Zedillo and known as the “High-level Panel on Financing for 
Development” (2001). The study estimated that to reach the MDGs an additional $50 
billion per year in ODA would be needed, plus $3 billion more in humanitarian aid, and 
about $15 billion more for “global public goods.”  This brings the total of additional 
resources to at least $68 billion, or slightly more than doubling current levels of aid. 
 
4 A second widely cited study by Devarajan, Miller, and Swanson of the World Bank uses 
two estimates for costing the MDGs (Devarajan et al. 2002). First, it calculates the 
additional resources necessary to increase economic growth so as to reduce income 
poverty. For this it suggests a “financing gap” of $54-62 billion each year. Second, it 
estimates the cost of meeting specific goals in health, education and environment by 
using country-specific unit costs and then multiplying by the uncovered population. By 
this method it finds that $35-75 billion more per year are needed. Based on these two 
methods, the paper concludes that ODA increases in the range of $40-70 billion are 
required. Again, this is an approximate doubling of official aid flows, roughly confirming 
the Zedillo estimate. These numbers have been directly influential on major policy 
proposals; they were used, for example, as the basis for a 2003 plan by the UK Treasury 
to increase current global foreign aid by $50 billion by selling future aid flows to 
financial markets through an International Finance Facility.
11  The figure is also 
commonly cited by NGOs and other aid advocates.
12
 
A series of other papers have tried to quantify the costs of meeting the MDGs for 
particular regions, countries, or for meeting an individual goal. Some of the most 
commonly cited studies are summarized in Table 1. Of note, and relevance for later 
sections of this paper, are the various estimates for costing universal primary education 
(UPE) or Education for All (EFA), including $9 billion per year (Delamonica et al. 2001, 
for Unicef) and $10-15 billion (Devarajan et al. 2002). 
 
5 The costing methods used in these studies are by necessity, and usually by the authors’ 
own admission, simple and approximate. “It is clear that our present knowledge does not 
suffice to put a convincing price tag, even a rough one, on the cost of meeting the human 
development goals. Individual economies have not yet started to estimate the costs of 
meeting the goals, as they need to do if credible worldwide estimates are to be made 
available,” notes the Zedillo study (p.69). “…[T]hese estimates are extremely crude, and 
based on a host of heroic assumptions, many of which may not be borne out as history 
unfolds” point out Devarajan et al. (p.30).
14   
 
Most of these studies (but by no means all of them) are extremely careful to clarify that 
the resulting estimates are imprecise and also that several caveats apply to their 
conclusions. “[W]e cannot stress enough the fact that financial assistance is but one of the 
factors required to reach these goals” state Devarajan et. al  (2002, p. 30). The two most 
commonly cited caveats, and perhaps the most important, are (a) the policy environment 
within developing countries considerably improves, and (b) that current bottlenecks and 
capacity constraints are substantially relieved.   
 
Regarding policies, the Zedillo study, for example, assumes that recipients are doing 
“what’s necessary” to improve policies. Mingat et al. (2002), in looking at the costs 
associated with reaching universal primary education for 33 African countries, state that 
“the implicit assumption is that countries would reform their education sector policies as 
needed to ensure that resources are used to offer quality services in a cost-efficient 
6 manner” (p. ix). Oxfam (2002) suggests that local political commitment would be 
required (p. 9). 
 
Looking at absorptive capacity and other administrative bottlenecks, it is usually assumed 
that these are relieved. Mingat et al., for example, note that “[f]or the sake of simplicity, 
we set aside at this stage the physical feasibility of the EFA-by-2015 objective. We focus 
instead on the size of the financing gap…” (p. 1). The Devarajan paper is also predicated 
on the idea that the question to be answered is ‘if we achieved the MDGs by 2015, how 
much would it have cost?’—explicitly leaving aside the question of developing countries’ 
capacity to spend effectively such sums. They specifically note the capacity dilemma 
faced in particular by countries outside of Asia (see also Heller and Gupta 2002).  
 
Again, most of the authors of costing studies are quick to point out that these caveats are 
significant, and that the findings that result from their exercises are both very 
approximate and highly contingent. Despite these careful qualifications, many in the 
policy, advocacy and media world have inappropriately focused attention on the bottom 
line figure: $50 billion more in aid is needed to achieve the MDGs. The misuse and 
misinterpretation of the costing studies has added to the impression that resources and aid 
flows are the critical or even sole determinant of development outcomes.  
 
The UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, a prominent proponent of 
increased aid flows, has proposed an International Finance Facility that is explicitly based 
on the costing studies and makes the link between more ODA and meeting the MDGs.  
7 An IFF briefing note explains “Estimates suggest that development assistance must be 
doubled and focused on the poorest countries is the Millennium Development Goals are 
to be met—an increase of at least $50 billion a year.”  Elsewhere, Brown has been even 
more explicit that: 
 
…the key question is how we can meet in practice the ambitious Millennium 
Development Goals. If every child is to have primary education, we will need $10 
billion dollars more a year. If infant mortality is to be cut by two thirds and 
maternal mortality by three-quarters, we will need at least $15 billion extra a year. 




By juxtaposing the question of how to meet the goals “in practice” with a list of concrete 
dollar amounts, Brown implies that massive spending is a practical way to meet the goals. 
Similar statements from other leaders of the aid community are commonplace.  
 
The main section of this paper discusses the links in the chain of causality between 
increased aid flows and attaining the MDGs, and suggests that the caveats mentioned by 
study authors are indeed very significant—perhaps so significant that the MDGs are 
unlikely to be reached regardless of new aid flows.  The paper examines several specific 
MDGs and in greater detail to highlight some of these issues. In each case, it appears that 
many countries are very likely to miss the MDG targets, that rapid progress is 
nonetheless being made, and that the role for increased financing to accelerate trends has 
a limit. 
 
Reaching Goal One:  Halving Poverty  
8 The first MDG is to halve the 1990 poverty headcount by 2015. On a global scale, this 
goal is very likely to be reached, almost entirely because of poverty reduction in fast-
growing India and China.
16  At the same time, the majority of individual countries appear 
very unlikely to halve poverty by 2015 because the economic growth are extremely high 
by historical standards.  At the same time, it is doubtful that increased aid would 
sufficiently accelerate growth rates, especially in the countries that are currently most off-
track to miss the poverty reduction target. Methodologically, most of the costing 
exercises use the ‘financing gap’ to calculate the additional aid required for meeting 
growth targets, but this approach is problematic and raises further doubts about the 
estimates.  
 
Economic growth is central to the poverty reduction goal because it is the only source of 
increased income for the poor that can be (comparatively) rapidly achieved. Poor people 
in developing countries can become wealthier either through receiving a greater share of 
existing national income (redistribution of wealth from rich to poor) or a similar share of 
a greater national income (equitable economic growth).  However, it is historically very 
rare to see rapid changes in income inequality (up or down) over time, and so those 
countries that have achieved rapid and substantial poverty reduction have done so mainly 
through economic growth. Dollar and Kraay (2001) suggest a one-for-one relationship 
between average income growth and the income growth of the bottom 20%. Besley and 
Burgess (2003) suggests that the elasticity of poverty with respect to income per capita 
varies between –0.49 in Sub-Saharan Africa to –1.14 in Eastern Europe, with a 
developing country average of –0.73. Regardless of the precise elasticity, it is clear that 
9 to achieve meaningful poverty reduction, economic growth rates will have to accelerate 
in the countries where the poor reside.  
 
The World Bank (2004a) suggests that the typical African country will need to grow on 
average at least 7% for the next 15 years in order to halve poverty rates.
17  This compares 
to an average regional growth rate of just 2.4% for the past 15-year period.  Of the 47 
sub-Saharan countries only two, Botswana and Equatorial Guinea (combined, 
representing less than 0.3% of the continent’s population), have grown at the 7% rate 
over this period. Among African countries, nearly half (21) have seen negative per capita 
growth, and only nine (mostly small) countries have been above 2%. As a result, the 
poverty headcount ratio in Africa has actually increased, from 47% in 1990 to 49% in 
2000. And it is not just that high rates of growth are unusual for Africa; in the world as a 
whole, between 1985-2000 only five countries managed to sustain a 7% growth average 
(calculated from World Bank, 2004c).  
 
Figure 1 reveals the stark contrast between UN goals and performance in LDC growth 
measured by the Penn World Table. The UN General Assembly resolutions declaring the 
second and third “development decades” —the 1970s and 1980s—gave explicit goals for 
average real annual growth in GDP and GDP per capita in developing countries: 3.5% 
and 4.5%, respectively. In both cases, population growth was assumed to be 2.5% per 
year. The UN declarations for the first and fourth “development decades”—the 1960s and 
the 1990s—give only targets for GDP growth, but we can approximate the implied GDP 
per capita growth rate by assuming roughly the same rate of population growth of 2.5%. 
10 This means that the First Development Decade goal of 5% GDP growth implies roughly 
2.5% in per capita growth, and likewise implies that the Fourth Development Decade 
goal of 7% in GDP growth implies 4.5% in per capita GDP growth. Comparing all of 
these targets to actual LDC performance in the latter three decades of the twentieth 
century shows an arresting pattern. Every decade or two since the 1960s, the UN has 
increased its goal for developing country growth by 1%. Meanwhile, growth in LDCs has 
not changed very much. This “goal inflation” has now arrived at the point where what is 
expected of LDCs lies at the very extreme of the distribution. Decades after the first 
round of goals, we still do not know how to turn Zambia into Botswana, nor how to turn 
Laos into Korea. 
 
In the costing studies cited above, the expectation that unusually rapid growth rates might 
now be achieved more widely is based on two assumptions:  (a) that policy changes will 
foster growth and (b) that increased aid in the presence of those good policies will 
catalyze even faster growth. There are problems with both of these assumptions, 
however. Easterly (2003a), reviewing evidence of the link between aid and outcomes, 
concludes that aid agencies “have misspent much effort looking for the Next Big Idea 
that would enable aid to buy growth.” 
  
There is an ongoing debate between development economists who believe that policies 
are the major determinant of economic growth performance and those who believe that 
structural factors such as geography, history, and climatic conditions may play the 
dominant role. It may be fair to summarize that the evidence linking structural factors 
11 that do not change over time to growth is at least as strong as the evidence linking 
policies to changes in growth performance—in part because structural factors help drive 
policy choices, in part because of an independent direct impact.
18   It is also worth noting 
that cross-country evidence is not terribly clear on which policy levers might be the 
important ones for economic growth. As relevant, policy change has been historically 
slow and frequently reversed. Easterly et al. (1993) find policies far more stable than 
growth rates over time. The combination of a limited role for free policy choice in 
determining growth rates and limited evidence that dramatic improvements in policy 
stances are common suggests that the role for policy change to speed growth over the 
next fifteen years may be only modest. 
 
There is further caution required regarding the link between increased donor assistance 
and higher economic growth. This assumption underlies all of the costing studies which 
use the ‘financing gap’ model for estimating how much aid will be needed to reach 
certain growth targets. These estimates start from a measurement of poverty-income 
elasticity and current growth rates, which suggests a “growth gap”—the rate at which the 
economy must grow to see the desired reduction in the poverty headcount—or in the case 
of reaching the poverty MDG, to halve the poverty ratio by 2015. This approach then 
uses the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) to calculate what level of investment is 
required to reach the growth levels, then subtracts domestic savings to get the external 
financing gap—or the amount of required aid.  
 
12 The problem is that, in practice, the financing gap model does not appear to work. 
Easterly (1999) demonstrates weak relationships in developing countries all along the 
aid-to-investment-to-growth chain. If the financing gap approach had worked as expected 
over the period 1960-1994, he calculates that Zambia’s per capita income would have 
been $20,000, or 33 times the actual figure of about $600 (Easterly, 2001, p. 43).  
 
One recent and more positive contribution to the aid and growth literature is Burnside and 
Dollar (2000). This highly influential study has been used to make the case that aid can 
lead to growth under the right circumstances—including the policy environment assumed 
by many of the costing studies. The results of Burnside-Dollar appear to be somewhat 
fragile—changing the period, adding new country data, or altering the definitions of ‘aid’ 
or ‘good policies’ tend to weaken the results (Easterly, Levine, and Roodman 2003; 
Hansen and Tarp 2001; Lensink and White 2001; Guillamont and Chauvet 2001).   
Cassen’s conclusion some ten years ago still seems to hold: “Inter-country statistical 
analyses do not show anything conclusive—positive or negative—about the impact of aid 
on growth. Given the enormous variety of countries and types of aid this is not 
surprising.... If such a relationship does not emerge overall, it only shows the unexciting 
conclusion that aid may or may not be strongly related to growth, depending on 
circumstances” (1994). More recently, Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004) have 
found striking evidence of a positive average effect of development aid on growth, once 
the type of aid analyzed is matched to the time horizon of its expected growth effect. 
While this effect is clear on average, it varies greatly by country and its magnitude is 
13 limited to a certain range—two reasons to question whether even unlimited aid could 
cause a particular high level of growth in any given country. 
 
It seems plausible to assume that the relationship between aid and growth in the presence 
of good policies does hold, at least under some circumstances. Does this suggest that 
significant increases in aid are likely to help meet the poverty MDG?  The answer is still 
uncertain. This is because most low-income countries where the poor reside either have 
poor policies and weak institutions (and thus are assumed unable to use additional aid 
effectively) or already receive considerable amounts of external assistance. This second 
factor may be a problem because even work that accepts a link between aid and growth 
finds that, above a certain level of aid, the relationship begins to break down (Collier and 
Dollar 2000).
19 Many poor countries already thought to have ‘good policies’ already 
receive substantial aid. Mozambique, for example, receives ODA more than twice the 
level of its domestic tax base. Other top-performing countries—such as Ghana, Ethiopia, 
Uganda, Nicaragua, Honduras, Burkina Faso, and Tanzania—receive aid flows well 
above 10% of GDP. Were total ODA levels to be doubled, as called for in the costing 
studies, the countries that are perhaps best able to absorb large aid increases are India and 
China, which currently receive minimal aid (0.36% and 0.13% of GDP, respectively). 
However, these two countries are both considered “on track.”
20  The MDGs do not 
change the oft-noted irony of aid:  those that need it most are frequently the ones least 
able to use it effectively.
21  
 
14 Reaching the Social Sector Goals 
We turn now to the social sector indicators included in the MDGs.  
There is already a large literature on the complex relationships between conditions, 
interventions, and outcomes, but this appears to have been somewhat neglected by the 
public discussion of the MDGs. For example, when it comes to most health or education 
variables, at a single time they are quite closely related to income (Pritchett and Summers 
1996). However, over time, progress on these indicators as well as many others tested by 
Easterly (1999) are not correlated with the rate of growth in that country, but instead with 
improvements over time common to all countries.
22  Given this, it may be difficult to 
considerably speed that progress through policy changes or alteration in resources.  
 
Adding to the complexity of the causal chain between expenditures and outcomes is the 
fact that certain sector interventions can have impacts on other sector outcomes. Kremer 
and Miguel (2001), for instance, found that de-worming programs had a strongly positive 
impact on school attendance in Kenya. Ranis and Stewart (2001), who found that health 
expenditures appeared to have little or no impact, did suggest that increased female 
primary enrollment had an impact on life expectancy. Hicks (1982) also found that 
variations of life expectancy were insignificantly correlated with measures such as 
population per doctor and overall income per capita changes, but significantly related to 
literacy and inequality.   
 
All of this suggests that (a) additional aid may not be the most important factor in 
improving social outcomes; (b) the sectoral distribution of aid to maximize progress on 
15 any particular social MDG is not clear; (c) unit-cost approaches utilized in costing studies 
may be dramatically misleading; and (d) ‘best practices’ may not be easily exportable 
because they are dependent on a range of determining factors that may be difficult to 
replicate. Of course, some of the costing study authors have suggested such problems 
themselves
23, but this has not stopped the widespread misinterpretation of their work. 
 
To better illustrate these arguments and the weaknesses in the costing approach to the 
MDGs, we turn now to the specific social sector goals and the historical record, focusing 
mainly on the second MDG of achieving universal primary education and, briefly, 
touching on the other goals. 
 
Goals Two and Three: Universal completion of primary school and Gender Equality in 
Education
24
Over the decades, rates of primary enrollment and completion have risen nearly 
everywhere—even in many of the very poorest countries—and they have risen at 
remarkably uniform rates. Figure 2 gives an overview of what happened to enrollments 
between 1960 and 2000.
25 The figure answers the following question: If we were to make 
the assumption that the growth of primary enrollment across time in all countries 
followed the same pattern, based on one particular S-shaped curve (or “logistic” curve), 
what would that curve look like? The figure takes the path that each country followed 
during those four decades, and lines up each country individually so that, if following that 
single curve, it would have hit the 50% enrollment mark in the same year—“adjusted 
year” zero. 
16  
Two things jump out from the graph. First, our assumption is not that bad; countries’ 
idiosyncratic paths from low to high enrollment cluster remarkably closely around a 
single S-curve, whose slope at the halfway mark (or “transition speed”) is about 0.04. 
There is variation around the curve, but remarkably little given that the countries there 
include tropical and arctic, rich and poor, socialist and capitalist, war-torn and peaceful. 
Second, the slope of the curve, or the “typical” transition speed from low to high 
enrollment, is low compared to growth rates required to meet the MDG target. While the 
extension of mass schooling in the latter half of the 20
th century was vast, it also took a 
long time. If it started at 50% enrollment, the typical country—rich or poor—would have 
risen to 70% after 22.3 years, 80% after 36.4 years, and 90% after 57.7 years.  
 
Figure 3 shows that for the 90 countries for which we have data—representing a very 
broad range of wealth and institutional, political, and geographic conditions—no country 
has a transition speed above 0.13, the rate required to increase enrollment from 80% to 
95% over a fifteen year period. There are 38 countries in this data set that have 2000 
enrollment rates below 80 percent.  For these countries (and others for which we do not 
have data), reaching 95 percent enrollment by 2015 (still short of the MDG target) will 
require historically unprecedented rates of progress. 
 
It appears unlikely that many countries will even manage to approach the 0.13 transition 
rate.  One reason for, or at least a related phenomenon to, the strong historical 
determinism of primary enrollment growth rates is the strong relationship between 
17 parental primary completion and child enrollment.  This correlates with more than ten 
times the amount of cross-country variation in transition speeds than does education 
spending.  A second factor that explains cross-country variance in the transition speed 
with ten times the strength of differences in education expenditures is income. This all 
suggests a significant ‘demand side’ element to primary education, with wealthier, 
educated, parents far more willing to send their children to school. Filmer (2004) 
estimates that even if all rural people in a sample of 22 countries lived right next door to a 
school, enrollment rates would only increase from an average of 49.8 percent to 53.1 
percent—suggesting the dominance of ‘demand-side constraints.’ Across countries, there 
is no significant relationship between public spending per child on education and the 
primary school completion rate once income is controlled for (World Bank 2004b). 
 
Given that education expenditures do not appear to be a particularly strong historical 
determinant of enrollment, given not all countries will grow rapidly, and given it is very 
hard, in a fifteen year period, to dramatically increase parental primary completion rates, 
it is unlikely that many countries will achieve high transition speeds.  Indeed, even most 
‘exceptions to the rule’ or ‘best practices’ of rapid increases are, sadly, related to unique 
circumstances, considerable reductions in quality, or questionable data (Clemens 2004).   
 
Turning to gender equality in education, Figure 4 shows the path taken by the female-to-
male ratio in gross primary enrollments, for all 168 countries in the UNESCO database 
since 1950. The figure is constructed in a manner identical to that of Figure 2. Once again 
we see that, the assumption that all countries follow the same S-shaped path to gender 
18 parity is not strictly true but neither is it far from the mark and the typical country has 
taken a long time to reach gender parity in primary school enrollment. The shape of the 
curve in Figure 4 suggests, for example, that a country whose ratio of girls’ gross primary 
enrollment to boys’ is 0.8 typically takes 28 years to reach a ratio of 0.95. In the year 
2000, 17 countries had a ratio of less than 0.8.  Nevertheless, the great majority of 
developing countries are already fairly close to meeting the MDG target of gender 
equality in education.
28 A substantial majority of countries will likely reach this particular 
goal by 2015.  The use of static unit costs in education estimates, as used in the costing 




Goal Four: Reducing child mortality by two-thirds 
In the fourth MDG, governments have committed themselves to reducing child mortality 
by two thirds between 1990 and 2015.
30 Assume, as we did for education, that infant 
mortality follows an S-shaped curve, in this case in which countries start out at some 
historically high level and fall toward some new level at a rate that is proportional to the 
current level. Next, assume (again as we did with the education goals) that every country 
follows the exact same S-curve—in this case towards zero infant mortality—but (again) 
that each country goes through this transition at a different time.  
 
These assumptions once more appear reasonably robust. Figure 5 shows what happens if 
we take data for 35 rich and poor countries covering roughly the 20
th century, assume that 
the historically highest level was 350 infant deaths per 10,000 live births, and 
19 horizontally align all the series so that every country passes through 50% of the 
maximum—that is, 175—in the same year (“adjusted year” zero). The lessons are 
familiar from the previous two sections. Immediately we see that (1) there is remarkably 
little diversity in the rate at which this has occurred, and (2) the typical experience of a 
country in the 20
th century was that this transition was slow as compared to the MDG 
target decline. The slope of the S-curve running through the middle of the cloud, 
representing the experience of the ‘typical’ country among these 35, is –0.0339 at the 
inflection point. That means that a country typical of this group, if it started out at 100 
infant deaths per 10,000 live births, would take 40 years to decrease this level by two 
thirds. This figure is relatively insensitive to the starting level. 
 
Nor has the story dramatically changed in the late 20
th century, despite technology 
advance.  Although technological and economic advances allowed for far lower infant 
mortality rates essentially everywhere in the late 20
th century, the speed at which 
countries made the transition from high to low infant mortality did not change 
significantly.  If we now restrict the sample to the years 1980-2000, and consider all 176 
countries for which the World Development Indicators provide infant mortality rates, the 
slope of the S-curve is –0.0324 at the inflection point. A typical country in this group of 




To be more specific, let us imagine that the fourth MDG had been set in 1975—to reduce 
child mortality by two thirds in the quarter century leading up to 2000—and compare this 
20 goal to what actually happened. Figure 6 shows that of the 109 countries for which we 
have data, 33 would have met our hypothetical goal of decreasing child mortality by two-
thirds in 25 years. At the same time, of those countries that achieved a two thirds 
reduction in child mortality over the 1975-2000 period, none were amongst the poorest. 
Only one country with an income below $1,600 in 1975 reduced child mortality by two 
thirds over the next 25 years: Indonesia.  This is not to say that the period 1990-2015 
must exactly replicate the experience of the period 1975-2000. It does point out that we 
have the experience of only one country with an income of below $1,600 in 1975 to offer 
as a model to countries in that income bracket today trying to replicate such an 
achievement.   Unfortunately, we return to the same theme: setting aside the uniquely 
favorable conditions in Indonesia, widespread achievement of the fourth MDG has no 
recent precedent in poor countries. 
 
This suggests that the forces that primarily determine the speed of this transition go 
beyond public health policy and inputs—a conclusion supported by a number of different 
studies.  Health outcomes are not related to expenditures (Filmer et al. 2000). Across 
countries, there is no significant relationship between public health spending per capita 
and under five mortality once income is controlled for (World Bank 2004b, see also 
Hanmer and White 1999; Thorbecke and Charumilind 2002).  Indeed, 95% of the 
variation in child mortality across countries can be explained by national income and its 
distribution, female literacy, ethnolinguistic fractionalization and the predominant 
religion of the country (Filmer and Pritchett 1999).  It appears that one of the reasons that 
interventions often do not have the desired outcome is—as Pritchett (1994) showed with 
21 the relative ineffectiveness of family planning aid—that supply-side responses do not 
address the demand component that are affected by broader social and economic changes 
And income, inequality, literacy, ethnic makeup and religion are all factors slow to 
change, at least within a fifteen-year perspective.   
 
None of this is to say that specific public health interventions and large injections of 
inputs purchased by aid cannot affect infant mortality; obviously they can. Hanmer et. al 
(2003) suggest that while income per capita, education and gender inequality are all 
robust determinants in explaining infant and child mortality across countries at a single 
time, some health spending (particularly on immunization programs) can also have a 
significant impact, for example.  Rather, it is to question whether the rapid increase in the 
mortality transition rate needed to meet the fourth MDG is accessible to even the wisest 
and best-funded policy interventions. 
 
Goal Five: Reducing maternal mortality by three quarters 
In the fifth MDG, the world’s governments committed themselves to reducing the 
maternal mortality rate (MMR) by three quarters between 1990 and 2015. MMR is the 
number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. Reliable international figures on 
MMR have only begun to be gathered relatively recently, and those that do exist contain 
a significant margin of error. Nonetheless, we can use the existing numbers with all of 
their imperfections to get a broad idea of how quickly the transition from high to low 
maternal mortality has been occurring in most countries.  
 
22 We do not have the 25 years of data on MMR that we would need in order to conduct 
exactly the same exercise here that we did for child mortality. The World Health 
Organization’s internationally comparable statistics begin in 1990 and were updated in 
2000. But we can ask how many countries were making the transition during the 1990s at 
an annual rate that, if continued for 25 years, would be sufficient to meet the fifth MDG. 
This rate is an annual decrease of 5.39% in MMR. 
 
Figure 7 suggests the answer. Average rates of change in MMR have been slow 
compared to the rates of progress required to meet the MDG target.
32   A good number of 
countries have managed a rate of progress that, if sustained over the next fifteen years, 
would allow them to meet MDG targets. Sadly, about as many have seen increases in 
maternal mortality rates over the course of the 1990s. Furthermore, as with infant and 
child mortality, progress has been faster in wealthier countries. The median annual rate of 
decrease in maternal mortality for all 140 countries in the figure was 2.10%. Among the 
42 countries below $1,600 GDP per capita, only seven were able to reduce maternal 
mortality during the 1990s at the annual rate of 5.39% required by the fifth MDG (the 
upper-left quadrant of the figure), and the median annual decrease was 1.15%. In other 
words, the rate of change in MMR called for by the fifth MDG requires a quintupling—or 
more—of the rate that MMR has been changing in most poor countries. These broad 
conclusions are robust even to substantial measurement error in the MMR figures. In 
countries richer than $1,600 GDP per capita, the median rate of decrease was 3.20%. 
 
23 Of further concern is that rapid progress over the last decade appears to have been 
concentrated amongst countries with the highest MMR rates at decade-start. All seven of 
the poor countries in Figure 7 that progressed at rates compatible with the goal began the 
1990s with an MMR over 850. Of all 124 countries for which we have data that started 
out the decade with an MMR lower than 850, not one was able to reduce MMR at the rate 
envisioned in the fifth MDG. The declines in MMR managed by many countries which 
started the decade with MMR rates of above 850 is laudable, and suggests significant 
development progress.  However, it may be that these countries were able to seize upon 
the high-return public health interventions most accessible to changes in policy to achieve 
that result.  If this is the case, sustaining a similar rate of progress in the future will be 
more complex, and even fewer countries will be able to continue reducing MMR at rates 
high enough to meet the MDG target. 
 
We can say less regarding the potential impact of increased donor resources and the 
applicability of the unit-cost approach to the MMR goal than we can with other goals, in 
part because less data is available.  Shiffman’s (2000) work suggests some hope, here.  
His regression results suggest that health expenditures as a percentage of GDP and (more 
significantly) the percentage of women receiving trained assistance at child-birth join 
female secondary school enrollment in being able to explain 90 percent of the cross-
country variation in MMR.  Nonetheless, given the demands for a pace of change that is 
rapid by historical standards, the MDG regarding maternal mortality may be missed by 
most countries regardless of increased expenditure by developing country governments 
and donors.     
24 Leaps forward? 
It is not that we cannot imagine a scenario where historically unprecedented progress is 
made in Millennium indicators.  If effective preventative and treatment interventions 
available for preventing childhood mortality (including antenatal checkups, delivery by 
trained personnel and DPT3 vaccinations) became ubiquitous, the number of under-five 
deaths worldwide might fall by as much as 63 percent.  And one recent cross-country 
analysis suggests that, in countries with good governance, additional health spending and 
aid financing can have an impact on health outcomes (World Bank, 2003b).  Yet this 
same study suggests how hard it would be to meet the health MDGs in Africa, and why 
the MDGs at their current levels are over-reaching. First, the average quality of African 
government institutions as measured by the World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment would have to leapfrog to one standard deviation above the 
mean global score (from significantly below the average today).  Then government health 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP would have to reach as much as 16.5 percent – or an 
implausible level greater than that spent by any country in the world.   
 
It may be that progress in meeting some of the other MDGs—perhaps in particular 
halting the spread of HIV/AIDS, reversing the incidence of malaria and halving the 
proportion of people without sustainable access to drinking water and sanitation—could 
in fact be rapid enough to meet the MDG timetable.
 33 This appears possible because a 
small number of technological advances, or a significant increase in investment in a 
particular infrastructure, could have a major effect on these areas in ways not obvious in 
the other goals. The creation of a malaria vaccine, for example, would have a 
25 monumental impact toward meeting the sixth MDG,
34 but it is difficult to imagine a 
similar single technological advance that would significantly impact education outcomes. 
Additionally, donor funds have in the past played a valuable catalytic role in supporting 
research and development and in meeting supply-side shortages in these areas.  
 
Making the perfect the enemy of the good 
Growing concern that the MDGs will not be achieved should not obscure the bigger 
picture:  development progress in terms of social indicators has been occurring at 
unprecedented levels throughout the great majority of the world’s population over the 
past thirty or more years. For example, divergence in life expectancies between rich and 
poor countries that had been occurring since perhaps as early as the fifteenth century has 
been dramatically reversed in the second half of the last century. Between 1950-99 (using 
country-level data covering 87% of the world’s population) the population weighted 
average life expectancy has risen from 51 to 69 years while the population-weighted 
standard deviation has fallen from 13 to 7 years (Kenny 2005). Data on infant survival 
suggests a similar performance. In the second half of the 20
th century, average global 
literacy increased from 52% to 81%, while the weighted standard deviation dropped from 
38% to 17%. Turning to female literacy as a percentage of male literacy, over the 1970-
2000 period, the global average ratio has improved from 59% to 80%. 
 
This reflects a dramatic long-term improvement in social indicators even for countries 
that have seen limited economic growth.  For example, average life expectancy for 
countries at $300 GDP per capita in 1999 is slightly higher than that for countries with a 
26 GDP per capita of $3,000 in 1870 (in constant dollars). In other words, it now takes only 
one tenth the income to achieve the same life expectancy as it did 130 years ago (Kenny 
2005).  
 
It is hard to view this progress as anything other than a dramatic success. Even if 
divergence continues “big time” with regard to income (Pritchett 1997), other quality of 
life indicators suggest historically unprecedented improvement. There are, of course, 
significant clouds on the horizon—the AIDS pandemic is having a particularly dramatic 
impact in Sub-Saharan Africa, where life expectancy in the region as a whole has 
declined in recent years, and is likely to level off only in 2010 (Easterlin 2000). 
Nonetheless, it is not clear why we should expect progress to halt more broadly.  
 
A continuation of the progress that has characterized the typical developing country of 
the last fifty years will, by and large, leave countries missing the MDGs in 2015, yet still 
outperforming the historical trajectories of now-developed countries. In Figure 8, for 
example, we see the trajectory of primary school enrollment for Burkina Faso. The 
country is on a trend well above the typical country since 1960 and even further ahead of 
the typical rich-country transition in the 19
th Century.  (The same statement is true of 
Mali, Senegal, Madagascar, and Nicaragua, among others.)  Surely this is not 
unambitious performance. Despite this success, Burkina Faso will fail to meet the MDG 
target.  It is perhaps worth asking whether the success or the target should be questioned.    
 
Moving Forward:  Re-interpreting the MDGs 
27 There is a long history of international goal setting for development.  A steady succession 
of international conferences since the 1940s have for instance declared universal primary 
education achievable within a short-time period and pledged to make the necessary 
investments to do so (Clemens 2004).  Nevertheless, countries all over the world 
continued to undergo the slow adjustments of their societies and economies that have 
allowed more children to go to school. But in setting unrealistic goals and claiming that 
they can in fact be universally met, the MDGs may run the risk of creating a climate of 
inaccurate pessimism about both development and aid.  
 
The Millennium Development Goals can be understood in two ways.  One interpretation 
is to take the specific goals of the MDGs literally⎯accepting them as the real targets of 
the development community⎯and take the costing study estimates as the amount of aid 
needed to reach those goals.  This view sees the MDGs as an important mechanism for 
raising aid flows and ensuring accountability for donor promises. It also believes that a 
big push on aid⎯for example, the calling for a “Marshall Plan” for Africa⎯can 
accelerate progress beyond historical norms and meet the MDGs. A literal interpretation 
of the MDGs and a misreading of the costing studies can lead to the belief that huge aid 
flows can quickly produce epochal change in an array of development indicators across 
broad regions. Perhaps such outcomes will be achieved, particularly regarding the goals 
in areas such as water and sanitation, but as we have seen, the historical evidence 
suggests it is unlikely that the majority of goals will be reached by the majority of 
countries. 
 
28 The determinants of the outcomes embodied by the MDGs are in fact complex. Time 
itself clearly is an important factor, but this is not accounted for by universal time-bound 
goals. Many of the available interventions in terms of policy reforms or increases in 
resources are supply-side responses, and can do little to increase demand, which is linked 
to longer-term social and economic changes. Lack of demand is partly responsible for the 
low levels of education, health care, and other development indicators. This does not 
mean that poor people do not desire better standards of living; it does mean that the range 
of incentives faced by many poor people lead them to make choices that might contradict 
the outcomes represented in the MDGs. This offers one reason why outcomes seem to 
change only slowly, and also suggests that there may be a limited potential role for aid in 
meeting extremely ambitious, universal, time-bound goals. This does not claim in any 
sense that aid is unimportant or ineffective, but only that aid cannot by itself deliver the 
MDGs.  
 
A second understanding of the MDGs is a more nuanced view—that the goals are a 
symbol of the kinds of outcomes toward which the development community should 
strive. Similarly, new aid flows are considered just one of several necessary conditions 
for progress on development indicators. By themselves, new aid flows are insufficient. 
We might imagine a pair of structural equations representing the relationship between aid 
and outcomes: The first of the two equations has progress towards the MDGs (such as 
school enrollments) on the left-hand side and aid on the right hand side, but there are 
many right-hand side variables, many of which interact with the effect of aid. The other 
equation has progress toward the MDGs on the right-hand side and aid on the left-hand 
29 side.
37 For example, unit costs might give us some very rough idea of how much it would 
cost to pay for the schooling of all children in Mali if all of them were in school, but that 
number is the coefficient on schooling in the second equation, in which schooling causes 
aid. That coefficient need not provide any information about the coefficient on aid in the 
first equation. That is, such a number is potentially irrelevant to the “cost” of causing 
outcomes with aid. 
 
This second interpretation takes the MDGs as a tool, not a practical target. Goals generate 
discussion, focus attention, and help assign accountability for leaders’ pledges. The 
MDGs may have served these purposes to some degree. There can be little doubt that the 
MDGs helped galvanize the aid community and reverse the aid declines after the end of 
the Cold War. The United States, the European Union, Canada, Norway and others made 
promises of substantial aid increases at Monterrey in 2002, a result doubtlessly 
influenced by the MDG negotiations two years earlier.  
 
In spite of these notable benefits of the MDGs—even when taken as symbolic rather than 
literal—there has been almost no discussion so far of potential costs of the specific form 
taken by these goals. These potential costs take two distinct forms: unreasonable 
expectations about what is likely to be achieved within a short time period, and 
unreasonable expectations about the role of aid in the development process. 
 
First, the specific targets of the MDGs have set up many countries for unavoidable 
‘failure’. Some governments pursuing wise policies and making historically encouraging 
30 progress on development indicators could be weakened or delegitimized by the label of 
‘failure’ in 2015. Many countries have made and will continue to make progress on the 
indicators comprised by the MDGs at historically extraordinary rates. The MDGs confuse 
interpretation of their performance with universal, time-bound targets that for many 
countries are, in practice, impossible to reach. Costing studies, by positing that such goals 
are attainable and asking merely for the resource inputs, contribute to the illusion that the 
goals are attainable for all countries. Even if most development practitioners know this is 
not true, they must recognize that the expectations of many have been raised. 
 
Another potential downside is the possibility for adding to donor fatigue and distracting 
recipient countries from much-needed domestic reforms. If donors do provide additional 
tens of billions of dollars in aid per year sometime in the next few years, and if 
subsequently many of the goals are still not met, this will provide ammunition to interest 
groups in rich countries seeking to give up on development assistance. Developing 
countries will undoubtedly need many decades of sustained assistance—like Korea, 
Botswana, and other eventual successes received—and this must not be interrupted by 
declarations of failure in 2015. On the other hand, if the extra money does not materialize 
soon and the goals are not met in 2015, this may help legitimize several leaders in the 
developing world who pursue policies that are anathema to economic growth. What could 
we do, they will ask, when the rich countries broke their promises? The ensuing finger 
pointing could also undermine constituencies throughout the developing world for 
necessarily slow but essential reforms toward transparency, accountability, rule of law, 
and meritocracy. 
31  
What to do now?  Moving forward, the donor community should accept it is not feasible 
for the majority of countries to reach the majority of the MDGs.  Similarly, the costing 
studies should not be invoked as evidence that we can purchase outcomes with more 
assistance. The studies themselves make no such claims, and history shows this is highly 
unlikely to be true.  Instead, the MDGs should be presented as useful benchmarks that 
publicly bring out the stark contrast between the world we want and the world we have, 
and cause us to redouble our search for points of intervention to close the gap. 
 
Second, the donor community might consider ways of institutionalizing the recognition 
of development success. The government of Burkina Faso, for example, should be 
supported and lauded by the international community for raising school enrollments 
much faster than most poor and now-rich countries did in the past, not criticized and 
delegitimized because primary enrollment is less than 50%. Country-specific benchmarks 
can help signal when interventions of some kind are necessary, and they can also provide 
markers for progress along the way, given a country’s circumstances. Much public 
discussion of the MDGs has instead revolved around compiling lists of “off-track” 
countries. A more constructive and useful approach might instead list countries that are 
‘on-track’ or better after taking account of their particular circumstances and historical 
trends. Some kind of institutionalized response by the international community would 
thus redefine Burkina Faso as the educational success it has been. This would not in any 
way endorse the fact that half of Burkinabe children still do not enroll in school, nor 
imply in any way that schooling is not their right. It would, however, give important 
32 international pressure to support those who for decades have been working to get 
Burkinabe children into school at a rate faster than many far richer countries have 
managed.  
 
Lastly, future international development goals might avoid some of these pitfalls.  The 
next round of goals should: (a) be country-specific and flexible, more like today’s IDA 
targets; (b) take historical performance into account; (c) focus more on intermediate 
targets than outcomes; (d) be considered benchmarks  to spur action in cases where 
assistance is not working, rather than technically feasible goals.  
 
This last point is worth emphasizing:  It is useful to know that a country is raising school 
enrollments more slowly than the historically typical rate. It can give political support to 
constituencies in that country seeking changes in national policies, it can spur donors to 
intervene and support change through financial and other means. But this is much 
different from the effects of declaring that it is feasible for a country to raise enrollments 
at five times historically typical rates. Country-specific benchmarks carry the benefits of 
goal setting without the potential downsides of universal goals.  This suggests that goal 
setting at the global level should be bottom-up rather than top-down—that is, the world 
targets should start from country goals and then aggregate up, rather than setting global 
goals and then estimating what countries would need to do to achieve them. 
 
Indeed, for the next round of goals, the donor community might consider avoiding 
global-level costing studies, especially for outcomes known to be only tenuously linked 
33 to financial inputs. Rough back-of the-envelope estimates can potentially be useful for 
identifying the hypothetical scale of resources and also for some limited supply-side 
interventions.  Yet the widespread misinterpretation of the studies suggests that, however 
narrowly conceived by the authors, that misuse appears difficult to avoid.  A more direct 
approach might be to cost specific interventions and link them to intermediate indicators 
rather than outcomes—for example, costing an immunization program rather than child 
mortality.  Calculating financing gaps and unit costs for final outcomes appear to merely 
create more illusion than illumination. 
 
It is worth stressing the caveats attached to our analysis. None of this is to argue against 
aid or that goal setting is per se counterproductive. Aid has clearly been an important part 
of developmental progress for many countries. Perhaps aid levels should increase by $50 
billion, but not with the expectation that this will cause the MDGs to be met. Similarly, 
goals should indeed be set to enhance accountability and allocational efficiency, but goals 
must take history and context into account or potentially risk malign irrelevance. 
 
Perhaps most significantly, we have based most of our argument on historical precedent. 
History can be a fickle guide to the future. To take two recent development trends as an 
example, the spread of the Internet has been more rapid than the spread of the mobile 
phone, which was in turn more rapid than the television, in turn more rapid than the fixed 
telephone. And the spread of democratic institutions in developing countries over the past 
fifteen years would have been poorly predicted based on a trend of declining democratic 
freedoms over the thirty years previously. It may be (and we hope it is) the case that 
34 policies will improve, that the environment for the effective utilization of aid becomes 
friendlier, and that technology and policy trends combine to allow historically 
unprecedented levels of progress across the broad range of development that is 
encompassed by the MDGs. Even if that is not the case, many countries will reach at least 
some of the MDG targets. More importantly, it is quite probable that the significant rate 
of improvement that we are already seeing in developing countries will continue in the 
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40 Table 1:  Costing the MDGs:  A Sample of studies 
 
Study Covering  Estimate  of 
additional 
resources per year 
Global poverty goal  $54-62 billion 
Global social and environmental 
goals 
$35-75 billion 
Devarajan, et al. "Goals for 
Development" (World Bank, April 
2002) 
Global primary education  $10-15 billion 
Vandemoortele, "Are the MDGs 
feasible?" (UNDP, July 2002) 
Global MDGs  $50-80 billion 
Global poverty goal  $15-46 billion, plus 
100% debt 
cancellation 
Greenhill, “The Unbreakable link” 
(Jubilee Research 2002) 
Global, other goals  $16.5 billion, plus 
100% debt 
cancellation 
“Last Chance in Monterrey”  (Oxfam 
2002) 
Global MDGs  $100 billion 
Asia and South Asia  double or triple aid  “Supporting Sound Policies…” 
(World Bank 2003a)  Africa and Central Asia  60% increase 
“Achieving the MDGs in Africa…” 
(African Development Bank 2002) 
Sample of 30 African countries  $20-25 billion 
Delamonica et al. (Unicef 2001)   Global primary education  $9.1 billion 
Primary education for 47 IDA 
countries “at risk” 
$2.5-5 billion  “Education for Dynamic 
Economies…” (World Bank 2002) 
African primary education  7x aid 
Naschold, “Aid and the MDGs” (ODI 
2002) 
Global primary education  $9 billion 
Filmer, “Costing the Goal…” (World 
Bank 2002) 
Global Primary education  $30 billion 
Mingat, et al. “Financing Education 
for all…” (World Bank 2002) 
Primary Education for 33 African 
countries 
$2.1 billion 
Brossard and Gacougnolle, 
“Education Primaire Universelle: 
Combien?” (Unesco 2001) 
African primary education  $2.9-3.4 billion 
Bruns et al., A Chance for Every 
Child (World Bank 2003) 
Low-income primary education  $5-7 billion 
 
The thrid column is meant only to give an indication of the additional resource estimates from a sample of studies.  These figures may 
not be directly comparable as some of the figures cited in this column are in constant US dollars with different base years, ranging 
from 1995 to 2002. Similarly, some studies distinguish between “total additional resources” and “external financing requirements” 
(netting out an estimate of increased domestic resources). Given the range of assumptions and deviations in estimates, we did not 
attempt to rectify these disparities for comparability. Our intention is merely to give a sense of the range of cost estimates that have 
been undertaken. 
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Source: Clemens (2004). 
 
 
A-3 Figure 3: What it would take to meet Goal Two. 
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Transition speed necessary to reach 95% by 2015, 
starting from 50% in 2003 (0.245)
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Infant mortality is deaths before age one per 10,000 live births. Data are quinquennial and aligned horizontally assuming that all pass 




A-6 Figure 6: Despite major progress on child mortality, only one country with a GDP/Capita 
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GDP per capita in 1975 (1996 US$), log scale
The decrease in child mortality is equal to one minus the ratio of child mortality in 2000 to child mortality in 1975, 
where child mortality is the number of children dying before age 5 per 10,000 live births. Child mortality data are from 
the World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003. Real GDP per capita data are from the Penn World Tables 6.1. 
A-7 Figure 7: Seven out of 42 countries with incomes per capita below $1,600 for which we 
have data were able to reduce maternal mortality during the 1990s at the annual rate 
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MDG 5, Target 6 is “Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio”. A cumulative 
decrease of 75% over 25 years implies an average annual decrease of 5.4%, the rate marked with a horizontal line in 
the figure above. Sources: Year 1990 mortality from World Health Organization. Year 2000 mortality from WHO, 




A-8 Figure 8: Many countries unlikely to meet the MDG for primary schooling are 
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A-9 Appendix: Table A-1, The Eight Millennium Development Goals (and 18 targets)  
 
Goal Target 
1.  Eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger 
•  Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people 
whose income is less than $1 a day  
•  Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who 
suffer from hunger 
2.  Achieve universal 
primary education  
•  Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls 
alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary 
schooling 
3.  Promote gender equality 
and empower women 
•  Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary 
education preferably by 2005 and in all levels of education 
no later than 2015 
4.  Reduce child mortality  •  Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-
five mortality rate 
5.  Improve maternal health  •  Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the 
maternal mortality ratio 
6.  Combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, and other 
diseases 
•  Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of 
HIV/AIDS  
•  Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of 
malaria and other major diseases 
7.  Ensure environmental 
sustainability 
•  Integrate the principles of sustainable development into 
country policies and program and reverse the loss of 
environmental resources  
•  Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation  
•  Have achieved, by 2020, a significant improvement in the 
lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers 
8.  Develop a global 
partnership for 
development 
•  Seven targets related to: trade; special needs of poor 
countries; special needs of landlocked countries and small 
island developing states; debt problems of developing 





A-10 Appendix: Data sources 
 
Infant mortality 1870-2000: Taken from the appropriate edition of Mitchell’s 
International Historical Statistics (1992, 1993, 1998) for 29 of the 35 countries. The six 
requiring alternate sources are Brazil, Burma, China, Indonesia, Thailand, and Turkey. 
For the period 1921-1938, figures for Burma, Thailand, and Turkey come from the 
League of Nations, Statistical Year-Book of the League of Nations (Geneva: League of 
Nations Economic Intelligence Service, 1941). In case of Thailand, the data refer to the 
“straits settlements” (which includes modern-day Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore) and 
after 1936 the Thai figures come from Constance M. Wilson, Thailand: A Handbook of 
Historical Statistics, (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1983), p. 46. For Turkey, the average of 
Greece, Yugoslavia and Egypt is used for benchmarks, and for the missing Turkish years 
in between those benchmarks, the trend for Egypt is assumed. Figures for Brazil are taken 
from A. K. Ludwig, Brazil: A Handbook of Historical Statistics (Boston: G.K. Hall & 
Co., 1985), p. 84. The unweighted average of the infant mortality rates of urban counties 
is used to estimate Brazil’s overall infant mortality rate. Infant mortality rates for Peru 
come from Mitchell (1993) from 1940 onwards. Before 1940, Peru is assumed to follow 
Colombia’s trend. Figures for China are estimated by India’s infant mortality rates, while 
the infant mortality rates of the Philippines are used as a proxy for Indonesia. 
 
In Figure 5, infant mortality is deaths before age one per 10,000 live births. Data are 
quinquennial and aligned horizontally assuming that all pass through 50% of a maximum 
value of 350 in “adjusted year” zero. The countries are (with start year of data in 
parentheses if not 1870): Argentina (1915), Australia, Austria-Hungary (Austria), Brazil 
(1920), Burma (Myanmar) (1925-1935, 1960-2000), Canada (1900), Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 
(1905), Chile (1905), China (1915), Colombia (1925), Cuba (1935), Denmark, Egypt 
(1920), France, Germany, Greece (1925), India (1915, except 1950), Netherlands Indies 
(Indonesia) (1905), Italy, Japan (1920), Mexico (1900), New Zealand, Norway, Peru 
(1925), Philippines (1905), Portugal (1915), Russia (1870-1950, 1980-2000), Serbia 
(Yugoslavia) (1890), Spain, Sweden, Siam (Thailand) (1925-1935, 1960-2000), Anatolia 
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1 UN General Assembly document A/RES/55/2, Sept. 8, 2000. 
2 In December 2000, the UN General Assembly requested that Secretary General Kofi Annan prepare a 
“road map” of how to achieve the targets of the Millennium Declaration to which the leaders at the 
Millennium Summit had committed in September of that year (General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/55/162, paragraph 18). Annan’s response, issued in September 2001 as the Road Map towards the 
Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, proposed the eight MDGs in their final 
form and by that name (General Assembly document A/56/326), drawing only on elements to which 147 
heads of state or government had directly agreed at the 2000 summit.  
3 www.developmentgoals.org   
4 The leaders gathered at the Millennium Summit committed only to halving global poverty, regardless of 
what happens in any given country or region. They never agreed that each country or region would 
individually halve poverty by 2015, though the first MDG has often been given this latter interpretation. 
The UN’s Human Development Report 2003 (pp. 198-202) and the World Bank’s World Development 
Report 2004 (pp. 254-255), for example, both track individual countries’ progress towards halving national 
poverty by 2015 as indicators of progress towards the first MDG. 
6 See, e.g., “Donors fail on education funding”, by Andrew Balls, Financial Times, March 29, 2004. 
7 “Donors” is used here to signify the 23 members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee. All 
ODA data comes from the DAC. 
8 For more background on the origins of the MDGs, see Devarajan 2002, pp. 4-5. 
9 Since 1970 the UN has had an explicit goal to raise ODA to 0.7% of GNI. The origin of the aid target was 
the 1969 Pearson Commission report, later accepted by the DAC and then endorsed by the UN General 
Assembly in October 1970. 
10 OECD, http://www.paris21.org/betterworld 
11 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/international_issues/int_gnd_intfinance.cfm 
12 See, for example, the UNDP (http://www.undp.org/mdg/faqs.html), Jubilee 2000 (Greenhill 2002), and 
Oxfam (2002). 
14 Other problems with the static unit cost technique, as Devarajan has observed, include the fact that it 
guides more aid to those countries where costs are highest—that is, those who will use the aid least 
efficiently—creating an incentive for even greater inefficiency. 
15 From a note written by Brown for BOND, a network of development NGOs in the UK 
(http://www.bond.org.uk/networker/june03/gbrown.htm). Three examples of newspaper reports and 
opinion pieces that discuss dollar amounts to meet the MDGs but fail to mention the need for policy reform 
in developing countries or aid reform in the developed world as part of the package: “Stubborn Debt 
Burden Spurs Search for New Ideas” Warren Vieth, Los Angeles Times 23 April 2004; “Brown Wants 
Alliance of Rich to Lift Africa” Carl Mortished The Times 17 February, 2004. There are innumerable 
others. 
16 Bhalla (2002) claims this has been reached already, but the World Bank disputes this (see World Bank, 
2004b). 
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17 Gottschalk (2000) estimates an even required higher rate of 8.2% for sub-Saharan Africa and 10.2% for 
Latin America. 
18 See Mosley et. al. (2004), Dalgaard et. al. (2004), Easterly et al. (1993); Sachs (1996), Sachs (1997); 
Easterly (2003b); Kenny (1999). See also Kenny and Williams (2001) for a review of the weak link 
between long-term growth and indicators covering trade, monetary, fiscal, industrial and social policies. 
19 Although Devarajan et. al suggest that, using the coefficients from Collier and Dollar, the $50 billion 
additional aid they suggest could be apportioned only hitting this binding constraint in two countries.  
Furthermore, if aid were better delivered by donors, this binding constraint might be even higher.  
20 And neither may want considerably more ODA. India recently announced that it was restricting its aid 
receipts to only six countries (Marcelo, 2003). 
21 It is also worth briefly mentioning here the second half of MDG Goal One, which aims to halve the 
number of people suffering from hunger.  While data weaknesses do not allow a detailed analysis of the 
likelihood of this target being reached, FAO data do suggest that progress can be rapid in reducing hunger. 
Fifty-eight developing countries saw declining malnutrition rates over the 1990s, with an average decline of 
25 percent.  However, at the same time, the unweighted average showed a decline of just two percent a 
result of significant malnutrition increases in some countries, such as Iraq.  Furthermore, progress was slow 
in some large countries, such as China’s decline in malnutrition rates from 16 to 9 percent, India’s 
reduction from 25 to only 24 percent, and Brazil’s drop from 13 to 10 percent 
22 Even if one accepts a close link between improvements in social sector performance and income growth, 
the rates of income growth required to meet MDG social targets are historically unprecedented –using 
cross-country variations in child mortality and income in 2000 to calculate elasticities suggests that low 
income countries would have to grow at 6.7% a year to reduce mortality by two thirds in 2015 (World 
Bank, 2004b). 
23 For example, Devarajan et al. (2002) use four different measures  to calculate a range of $10.4-27.6 
billion and Mingat et al. (2002) admit the unit cost approach is unreliable because it “ignores the dynamics 
of population and enrollment growth” (p, 30). 
24 This section is substantially based on Clemens (2004). 
25 The second MDG specifically refers to primary school completion rates, but in this section we discuss 
enrollment rates. This is because there are few historical data on completion rates. If anything, this change 
provides bias in the direction of meeting the goals more quickly, since completion takes longer than 
enrollment and enrollment is, by definition, an upper bound on completion. For more explanation, see 
Clemens (2004). 
28 In 2000, the World Development Indicators 2004 lists data for 131 countries on the ratio of girls to boys 
in primary and secondary education. Of those countries in that year, only ten remained below the level of  
80 girls per 100 boys. 
29 Various estimates of the cost for universal primary education are based on unit spending per child times 
the number of out-of-school children. The Delamonica et al. (2001) study for Unicef, for example, takes the 
net enrollment ratio and calculates the cost of raising this gradually to 100% by 2015. It adjusts for country 
variances by allowing a country-by-country unit cost, based on a constant ratio of per capita income, but 
assumes zero per capita income growth over the 15-year period. Thus, there is no connection in the Unicef 
model between education and changes in the wider economy—even though the evidence suggests that such 
factors are very important. 
30 The fourth MDG is defined in terms of child mortality. The analysis presented in Figures 5 and 6 uses 
infant mortality instead, since available infant mortality statistics extend much further back in time than do 
child mortality statistics. This is immaterial to our discussion, since the rates of change of infant and child 
mortality tend to track each other closely across countries. 
31 This figure is not strictly comparable with the above figure for the whole 20
th century, since the sample 
of countries is quite different and the post-1980 figure includes far more poor countries. 
32 The same holds true for related measures to MMR such as the percentage of births attended by a skilled 
health care worker (AbouZahr and Wardlaw 2001). 
33 In the case of access to clean water (where the MDG target is to halve the number without access), there 
are also indications that rapid progress can be achieved. WHO and UNICEF have data on the percentage of 
population lacking access in 1990 and 2000 for sixty countries where access in 1990 was not already at 
100%.  Looking at those countries, the average change was a 21 percent drop in the percentage without 
access and seventeen countries managed to slash the figure by more than 30% (just seven saw 
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deterioration). Further, it appears that almost as many countries with low initial access scores saw rapid 
improvement as did countries already close to universal clean water access in 1990.  WHO and UNICEF's 
1990 and 2000 data covering 63 developing countries where access to sanitation was not at 100 percent in 
1990, suggests again that the picture regarding this target may also be positive.  The average decline in 
those lacking access was 19.5 percent.  Only three countries saw a rise in the percentage lacking access, 
compared to 18 who saw a fall greater than 30 percent.  While progress can be rapid in some areas, 
however, Fay and Yepes (2003) suggest that 93 percent of the variation across countries in access to 
sanitation can be explained by income, share of agriculture in GDP and (most significantly) urbanization, 
suggesting that progress towards the MDG targets may have been historically more significantly influenced 
by structural changes than aid flows. Data vailable at 
http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_goals.asp 
34 Although, looking at determinants of malaria infection rates, McCarthy et al. (2000) calculate that 
weather, latitude, income, poverty and inequality account between them for 4.9 times the variation in 
infection rates than does access to rural health care (even though this does suggest some role for 
government expenditure and aid, see also Mills and Shillcutt, 2004). 
37 We thank Shanta Devarajan for suggesting this expository device. 
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